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Falling Man by Don DeLillo casts the event of 9/11 and its aftermath in such a 
way that the novel itself enacts an aesthetic terror aimed at explicating the ubiquitous 
social-atmospheric elements of community- and identity-formation out of which terror 
precipitates. As DeLillo figures terrorism in the novel as apocalyptic in that it is a 
violence that reveals the violence constitutive of political community, including the 
political community of liberal democracy, which ostensibly relegates violence to domains 
not considered legitimately political. DeLillo’s novel, as an act of aesthetic terrorism, not 
only thematizes the instantiation of terror that precipitates out of the violence of the 
political, but also examines the distinct elements in the social-political environment that 
make the environment vulnerable to precipitations of terrorism. Ultimately the novel 
presents two gestures toward exodus from the terroristic atmosphere, but these gestures 
necessarily fail because, focusing too much on the body as an atomic entity, the novel 
lacks a sufficient acknowledgment of the nature of biopolitical control in the present era. 
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Introduction: Terrorism and the Apocalyptic 
 
“These are the days after. Everything now is measured by after” (Falling Man 
138). As this quote attests, Don DeLillo’s 2007 novel Falling Man invites readers to 
encounter the event of the 9/11 terrorist attacks within an apocalyptic framework. As the 
towers collapse out of New York City’s iconic skyline, the prior conditions for 
confronting reality are irrevocably shattered in an apocalyptic moment that consists of a 
“shift in the basic arrangement of parts and elements” (240). The novel leads us through 
the apocalyptic scenario by following three characters, Lianne and Keith Neudecker, a 
separated married couple tenuously reunited after Keith’s survival of the attacks, as well 
as Hammad, one of the hijackers who participated in the suicide bombing of the towers. 
By selecting the 9/11 attacks as its narrative backdrop, DeLillo’s novel draws out the 
dynamic elements of power at work in an event produced by so-called “terrorists.” I will 
argue that DeLillo casts the event and its aftermath in such a way that the novel itself 
enacts a narrative terror aimed at reactionary processes of community- and identity-
formations. These processes, according to a logic of liberal democracy, would seek to 
immunize the legitimized violence of American political actors against the admission that 
the nature of the political is fundamentally already conditioned by antagonistic forces of 
terror. The terror of the novel allows for the spectacle of terror in the novel to uncover – 
through distinct explication of social concepts, such as religion, intimate community, and 
ritual, that are often taken as enmeshed together – the impossibility of deciding where 
properly legitimate boundaries can be drawn between religion, politics, and violence. 
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The scenario that emerges in Falling Man can be understood as apocalyptic for a 
few reasons. For one, the spectacle has cataclysmic effects on the affective condition of 
the city, whose material state of affairs are so fundamentally and “suddenly” altered.1 It 
would seem that this valence of the apocalyptic emerges from DeLillo’s own remarks in 
“In the Ruins of the Future,” his essay written soon after the event of the attacks. There 
he casts the event explicitly in terms of the conflict between the terrorists and the United 
States, saying that “there is no logic in apocalypse. […] This is heaven and hell, a sense 
of armed martyrdom as the surpassing drama of human experience” (34). In the 
apparently unaccountably “new” situation, habitual logics fall away, as previous logics 
and narratives have been made to submit to a violent drama of eschatological conflict – a 
war of stories in which one side has momentarily earned a cataclysmic upper hand. 
However, I argue – perhaps against DeLillo’s own suggestions in the earlier essay – that 
the scenario in Falling Man is apocalyptic in that it is revelatory. This follows the biblical 
etymology of the term, that apocalypse is literally an “uncovering,” in this case not only 
of agents who had been preparing in secret but also, like pulling away the face of an 
analog clock to see its gears in action, an uncovering of the power mechanisms that have 
already been at play and out of which these “new” forces emerge. Marco Abel argues, 
regarding “In the Ruins of the Future,” that the essay responds to the event of 9/11 “by 
mobilizing seeing as a narrative mode that works from within the image event without 
                                                     
1 I qualify “sudden” here because, as Nietzsche argues, suddenness is always illusory – 
what appears sudden to us is always just another stage in the playing out of an ongoing 
complex of force relations that elude us in the instant (Gay Science 112). The event is not 
atomistic but always constituted by plurality; the event is not marked by a neat division in 
time but is always a momentary glimpse on a process that has been going on and 
continues to go on. 
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imposing itself on it” (195). We could, then, argue that Falling Man performs its own sort 
of apocalyptic terror, as a narrative, not by imposing a meaning on the events of 9/11 and 
their aftermath but by violently directing our attention to the violence enacted by our own 
processes of making meaning and establishing common recognition through the event. 
While terrorism, like apocalypse, appears as a spectacular breach in the normal or 
normative order of things, terrorism reveals the latent forces that have been present all 
along, the violence always already inherent in the political. In this way, terrorism should 
be understood as an apocalyptic form of violence, with revelatory power. John R. Hall, in 
his analysis with Philip D. Schuyler and Sylvain Trinh of the violence that occurred late 
in the 20th century involving particular millenarian or apocalyptic sects, draws on Walter 
Benjamin’s interpretive frame of the historical present as shot through with “Messianic 
time.” He says, “In this light, though potent episodes of apocalyptic violence seemingly 
transpire outside the linear flow of History, they cannot be separated from the established 
social orders in which they arise. […] Apocalyptic violence marks the faultlines of an 
Apocalypse wider in scope. Observing the one will help disclose the other” (Hall 14). 
The violence that erupts in what are called acts of terror reveals the violence that is at 
play in the constitution of the social order into which, or more precisely, out of which 
terror precipitates. 
The explicatory nature of apocalyptic violence, as described by Hall et al., takes 
on a similar activity to that which others have argued is within the essential nature of 
modern terrorism. Peter Sloterdijk, for instance, argues that terror demands an 
acceleration in explication, or a profound increase in the articulation of atmospheric 
conditions – the very conditions for living – and the poisoning of these conditions 
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(Sloterdijk 7). He draws his analysis from the innovation of gas warfare introduced by the 
Germans at Ypres Salient in 1915, an event marking a shift in the essential methodology 
of modern warfare to what he calls “atmoterrorism,” targeting “no longer the body, but 
the enemy’s environment” (14). This new technology and science of modern warfare 
sought to explain the fundamental elements that comprise the air, or the conditions for 
life, in which the enemy exists and moves, and to poison those conditions, causing enemy 
combatants to literally breathe themselves to death. Under such conditions of terrorism, 
those caught in the play of modern warfare will continue to perform the habitual and 
necessary processes of maintaining their status of living within a poisoned domain, such 
that to continue to pursue life is to actively seize and ingest one’s death. It is possible, 
however, when interpreting such methodologies of modern terror within the framework 
of modern terror as apocalyptic violence, that the conditions of life as we know it are 
revealed to have always been poisonous and that the hegemonic faction presiding over 
the constitution of the political community that crystallizes out of the violence of the 
political, explicating their own conditions for survival against opposition, has cast its own 
immunizing gas over the atmosphere, eliminating what is pathogenic only to itself. What 
are called acts of terror by the hegemonic sect involve the invasion of the pathogen into 
the immunized system, but the invasion of the pathogen is at the same time the return of a 
violence that had been controlled by a more dominating violence. The apparent breach in 
the norm reveals what has been present, active in the atmosphere, all along. Falling Man 
delivers just such an apocalyptic terrorism in explicating these ubiquitous mechanisms of 
immunity that condition the political. However, in the last section of this essay, I will 
argue that, while the novel provides a couple gestures toward exodus from this 
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generalized terror, these gestures fail because the novel lacks a sufficient 
acknowledgement of the nature of power in contemporary control society. 
 
“There are no others.”: The Terror of Community 
 
 Falling Man is unique among post-9/11 novels for paying specific attention to the 
suicide bombers themselves. In the sections that conclude the novel’s three parts, Falling 
Man describes the sort of individual and communal subjectivities that administer acts of 
ideological terror. DeLillo reveals, in his explication of these presumably pathogenic 
social conditions that allow for the emergence of terrorism, the relations these social 
conditions hold to domains that liberal democratic conceptions would place beyond the 
definite limits of what is called terrorism. In a sense, then, the novel’s own act of terror 
consists of its presentation of social relations within and outside the presumptive “closed” 
space of the terrorist cell as structurally similar, thus making the more presumptively 
harmless assemblages of social conditions appear as amenable to terror. The latent 
conditions that produce terror inhabit all spheres of society, indifferent, in their dynamic 
nature per se, to the nationalistic or religious identifiers we apply to them. 
The novel, in this regard, characterizes what has been called “radicalization” as a 
function of community, of the personal relationships and singular affects at play in a 
particular community’s self-constitution. If we accept that the novel characterizes this 
process as a process bound up in community, then John Carlos Rowe is not quite right 
(though also not quite wrong) to say that DeLillo presents the terrorists here as the 
dogmatic totalitarian opposite of Western ambiguity (128-9). By casting Hammad’s 
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assimilation as happening through processes that, as I will show later, proliferate as well 
in DeLillo’s explication in the novel of American community-formation, DeLillo draws a 
symmetry between these terrorists and American power. The section titled “On 
Marienstrasse” narrates the gradual integration of Hammad into the Islamist cell, led by 
Amir (better known as Mohamed Atta), biding time in a German flat. Hammad’s 
integration involves an encounter with others who sought to share what they held in 
common with him as well, and the encounter is figured as contingent on their bodily 
nearness within the space of the flat, as counter-posed to the distance inherent to the 
state’s technologies of surveillance. “But we encounter face to face,” the narration goes. 
“A man turns up from Kandahar, another from Riyadh. We encounter directly, in the flat 
or in the mosque. The state has fiber optics but power is helpless against us. The more 
power, the more helpless. We encounter through eyes, through word and look” (81). In 
these lines, the affective associations in the local encounter between bodies and 
utterances, which are an important segment of the forces that allow this particular 
community to coalesce, prove more powerful than the state’s version of encounter, 
mediated through technologies of surveillance and security. This community crystallizes 
through the relationality of localized conversation, through praying together, and through 
the establishing of communal norms. An example of one such communal norm, linked to 
a specific liturgical morality, is the mandate for the men to grow beards. “They were all 
growing beards. One of them even told his father to grow a beard. Men came to the flat 
on Marienstrasse, some to visit, others to live, men in and out all the time, growing 
beards” (79). This growing of beards functions as a visible indication of the community 
members’ adherence to the group, a sign that while enforced locally as a common 
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practice also roots the group’s common practices in a dogmatic interpretation of Muslim 
ritualistic prescription. 
Amir, as an agent involved in the community’s ongoing self-constitution, uses 
this liturgical morality to point out to Hammad the ways in which he has not yet come 
into accord with the active identity of the group, which is contingent on a particular 
constellation of moral prescriptions. “Eating all the time, pushing food in your face, slow 
to approach your prayers. There was more. Being with a shameless woman, dragging 
your body over hers. What is the difference between you and all the others, outside our 
space?” (83). In order for Hammad to more fully identify with the group, to come into 
communion with them, he must have articulated to him the specific points at which he 
does not belong to the group, defined here as practices. Moreover, the difference 
delineated here by moral practice is not only about the inside and the outside of the 
community but also and more strongly one between friend and enemy. This call to 
repentance for Hammad is set against the visible signs of immorality (particularly sexual 
immorality) that Hammad earlier recognizes as indicating the enemies of the community, 
as he remarks on the setting of “local strolling whores” outside the flat: “Now he knew 
this as well, the face of combat in the long war” (78). In this way, the moral prescriptions 
of the group, involving a particular conception of what is the good of human action, do 
not merely designate one’s identity as belonging to the group but also draw the battle 
lines in what is interpreted to be a necessarily violent conflict between the community 
and its enemies. 
Hammad’s integration into the community as a friend, additionally, functions as 
an education in the interpretations of Islam that figure the entire struggle of Islam as a 
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historical war against Western forces, “determined to shiver Islam down to bread crumbs 
for birds” (79). Hammad listens to an older man, a former rifleman in the Shatt al Arab 
under Saddam Hussein, reflect on the war cries of the young Iranian martyrs that he was 
ordered to kill: “The boys were sounding the cry of history, the story of ancient Shia 
defeat and the allegiance of the living to those who were dead and defeated. That cry is 
still close to me, he said. Not like something happening yesterday but something always 
happening, over a thousand years happening, always in the air” (78). The Iraqi veteran’s 
comments here imply that this bloody conflict is a background condition of the present, 
that it has constituted the air within which political struggle takes place long before the 
particular battle at the Shatt al Arab, as though the violence of war and the necessity of 
martyrdom were simply precipitations of a larger global social-atmospheric violence. The 
goals of the community in the flat on Marienstrasse are articulated within this interpretive 
frame. For them, the violence that has always been in the background occurs between an 
Islam that, being an all-encompassing worldview and way of life, demands global 
expansion and the other factional forces that either seek to protect a hegemony that they 
already hold or demand their own total expansion. “There was the feeling of lost history. 
They were too long in isolation. This is what they talked about, being crowded out by 
other cultures, other futures, the all-enfolding will of capital markets and foreign 
policies” (80). The community experiences their isolation as a violation because the 
precepts of their common identity fundamentally oppose their privatization, their 
exclusion from the public arena. Hammad thinks to himself, “Even if the room is a place 
of prayer, he can’t stay there all his life. Islam is the world outside the prayer room as 
well as the sūrahs in the Koran. Islam is the struggle against the enemy, near enemy and 
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far, Jews first, for all things unjust and hateful, and then the Americans” (80). Implicit in 
these sentiments is the description of their Islamism as a religious globalism of identity. 
But, paradoxically perhaps, due to the seeming unboundedness of its claims to global 
territory, this Islamism is also the identity of a bounded community that negates the 
validity of other communities – it is a tragically finite communal identity that claims a 
territorial infinity. Elsewhere Hammad, more fully incorporated into the community at 
this point, picks up this theme in his reflections on the ultimate teleology of the group’s 
identity: “It was all Islam, the rivers and streams. Pick up a stone and hold it in your fist, 
this is Islam. God’s name on every tongue throughout the countryside. There was no 
feeling like this ever in his life. He wore a bomb vest and knew he was a man now, 
finally, ready to close the distance to God” (172). The global claims of the identity 
common to this group enforce and are enforced by the community’s common teleology. 
In accordance with the apocalyptic vision of the community, individuated distinctions 
between people are collapsed within what would be the fulfillment of this totalizing 
identity: “The time is coming, our truth, our shame, and each man becomes the other, and 
the other still another, and then there is no separation” (80). At the core of this terrorism, 
then, is a unified identity of a globalized community – a political community whose self-
constitution lays claim to identification of others who would constitute themselves 
otherwise. 
We see in Hammad’s transition from a marginally interested figure to his full 
incorporation in the cadre a glimpse of the mechanics by which intimate affective 
relations of communion may turn over into the enforcement of totalizing identities. The 
process of self-constitution for Hammad that functions first through his conversations 
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with the other men is catalyzed by his desire to belong to them. His move toward 
belonging involves two further movements: on the one hand, his appropriation of the 
common vision the group holds regarding the nature and future of the world and, on the 
other hand, the incorporation of the moral directives – the constitutional “I will not’s,” as 
Nietzsche might put it2 – of the community. As Hammad washes his identity into the 
more definitive identity of the group, grasping their dreams, imbibing their laws, we 
might call this process his “radicalization.” Yet this process is depicted in the novel as 
occurring through the altogether common affective process of achieving a sense of 
belonging in the world, of assimilating into a community. What makes this a 
radicalization, then, is the fact that this is a community organized around a core political 
identity, and a core delimitation of the good of global society. We see in this cell of 
Islamists a singular instance of the larger structures of terror that have governed and are 
governing, yet here manifesting themselves in a group that has not already gained 
hegemony. 
Here I refer to the definition of terror put forward by Hannah Arendt in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, where terror describes, more broadly than spectacular 
                                                     
2 Following a discussion of the sadistic forms of torture and sovereign penal practices that 
Germany used to enforce an anchoring German memory into the people, Nietzsche 
writes, “With the aid of such images and procedures one finally remembers five or six ‘I 
will not’s,’ in regard to which one had given one’s promise so as to participate in the 
advantages of society—and it was indeed with the aid of this kind of memory that one at 
last came ‘to reason’!” (Basic Writings 498). Here Nietzsche shows the manner in which 
unique moral imperatives can function as forces of violence in driving individuals into a 
particular constellation of community. While Nietzsche seems to suggest that the 
violence of morality necessarily comes backed by the strong-arm of direct or symbolic 
sovereign violence, it is possible that in the contemporary situation the seduction of 
community and the fear of being without it offers violence enough to function in the 
dynamic feedback loop of moral imperatives and forces of communal belonging. 
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instances of violence, the ideological motor of totalitarian power. Against the notion that 
totalitarian governments are essentially lawless, Arendt argues that they do enforce a law, 
but one which should not be understood as limiting in nature. Rather, totalitarian law is 
essentially motivating, aimed at affirming or producing a certain reality. Terror, in 
totalitarianism, describes the process of enforcing a fundamentally totalizing law. “Terror 
is lawfulness,” she writes, “if law is the law of the movement of some suprahuman force, 
Nature or History” (465). She describes terror as the realization of the law of movement 
and uses the examples that are key to Nazi totalitarianism (i.e. Nature) and to Stalinist 
totalitarianism (i.e. History). For both iterations of totalitarian government, something 
beyond immanent human action is taken to be guiding the forces of social development, 
defining their progression toward a futurity that, whether utopian or not, clearly sketches 
the direction in which progress flows. Moreover, in totalitarian governance there is an 
“identification of man and law” (462). We could extrapolate, then, from Arendt’s 
analysis of state terror that “terror” describes any and all of the mechanisms it takes to 
import this political-legal identity, this particular constitution of political community, into 
the individual’s mechanisms of self-constitution, such that the one becomes a microcosm 
of the people, a homunculus identically representative of the larger homogenous 
leviathan. However, as we have seen already on display in Falling Man, these 
mechanisms of totalitarian terror need not exist on the larger scale of national 
governments, and they also need not enlist either the forces of secret police or militant 
coercion in order to put subjects into accordance with the law. Falling Man instead shows 
that much less apparently drastic forces of typical community-formation – through 
intimate affective relationships between people seeking mutual belonging with each other 
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as well as belonging in the world – can also amount to terror. Following Arendt, terror 
requires simply the dual-elements of, on the one hand, a teleology of the world and, on 
the other hand, an active ideological identity that can enforce individual movement 
toward the telos of the world. The terrorism of the figures in Falling Man are then no less 
totalitarian for their lack of global hegemony or their lack of a legitimized state form. 
 However, what is at stake in this explication of the terrorism of Hammad’s cadre 
is not a presentation of that particular political community as exceptionally identifiable 
with the totalitarian power structures Arendt describes. Despite the implications of 
Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism – that these sorts of systems are to be contrasted with 
liberal democratic political systems that are presumed to possess an accessible public 
sphere for deliberating on the construction of a shared world and are themselves 
decidedly not terroristic – the explication of the particular force inherent in the strategies 
of the Islamist cell in Falling Man serves to reveal the structurally similar strategies of 
forces that are present in liberal democracy as well. In his essay “The Spirit of 
Terrorism,” Jean Baudrillard remarks on the way Americans have viewed Islam as a viral 
force, infiltrating various social realms across the globe, but Baudrillard reframes this 
inimical figuration of Islam as instead “the moving front along which the antagonism 
crystallized,” an antagonism between terroristic imaginaries that reside in each of us (15). 
While the methods and results of events of terroristic encounter, such as involved in 9/11, 
differ between each other both in form and in scope, the encounter is a conflict of 
terrorisms – that is, ways of enforcing a particular constitution of political community. 
The encounter with terrorism is an encounter with “an excess of reality” in opposition to 
the community’s own delimitation of reality (18). In other words, terrorism denotes both 
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the violence that functions in the imposition of an identity of life onto a political 
community that vies for hegemony and the image of that which is beyond the limits of 
that identity, that which would signal the death of the community so identified. Events of 
terror carry the symbolic weight of the shattering of that limit, the death of a particular 
articulation of life. 
 This violent encounter occurs not only in the realm of the imaginary and the 
symbolic but also between forces of political violence that are immanently active in the 
material production of political structures. The terror of the event is the crystallization of 
antagonisms, as Baudrillard argues, and these antagonisms animate legislation, civic 
organization, law enforcement, and other elements. This is at least no less the case in 
liberal democracy than in other political systems. Talal Asad argues against liberal 
democracy’s ostensible sanctions against violence, its ostensible separation of violence 
from legitimate political practices, and instead proposes that violence is integral to 
liberalism. However, liberalism has built into itself mechanisms of obscuring violence 
such that the forms violence takes involve a paradoxical “combination of cruelty and 
compassion that sophisticated social institutions enable and encourage” (3). Asad 
critiques “just war” doctrines and the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis to point out the 
ways liberalism attempts to hide its own spaces of violence by shifting the boundary lines 
between legitimate and criminal violence. In liberalism, legitimate violence is transferred 
to the domain of war, eliminating it from what is understood to be the domain of the 
political. Furthermore, as Asad claims commenting on Michael Walzer’s work, terrorism 
is criminalized, but exceptionally so, such that terrorism marks a crime worse than 
murder for the state of fear it uniquely provokes. “For Walzer, of course, it is not merely 
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the deliberate creation of fear for political purposes that defines terrorism; the killing of 
innocents is a necessary (though not sufficient) criterion” (16). By criminalizing terror in 
this way and by transferring legitimate violence against foreign adversaries (as well as 
members of the state’s own military) to the domain of war, liberal states allow 
themselves to respond to terroristic acts of violence with a congruent violence while 
absolving themselves of the legal attribution of guilt. 
While Walzer argues that what allows a state to commit such cruel violence is the 
state’s nature as an instrument of security for the political community it circumscribes, 
Asad argues that the modern state must not be understood as a mere instrument of 
political community. Rather, “[i]t is an autonomous structure that regulates, represents, 
and protects a community of citizens. The state authorizes the killing of human beings, 
demands the ultimate sacrifice of its citizens when they are at war. It seeks to maintain 
the correct demographic character and the desired territorial extent for the community 
that is its object” (19). The political community is the object of the state. The violence of 
liberalism emerges from liberalism’s own nature: the legal limits it sets and enforces, the 
violence necessary in the conditions of possibility for its originary foundation. In 
liberalism’s constitution of rights and liberties for citizens, as well as its criminalization 
of that which exceeds those limits, liberalism is horrified by terrorism because terrorism 
appears as a direct affront to the legitimacy of those limits. Terrorism appears to the 
liberal imaginary as “the limitless pursuit of freedom, the illusion of an uncoerced 
interiority that can withstand the force of institutional disciplines” (91). But liberalism 
has always already enacted violence as a means of maintaining its own political 
community. The illusions of tolerance and the regulation of freedom through civil rights 
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and liberties constitute the way the liberal state imagines itself, who it is and who it 
inscribes, so the forms of coercive violence used to preserve that community – through, 
for instance, the foundation and enforcement of laws – always appear as just, legitimate, 
and necessary to the liberal community. 
 This account of liberalism allows us to (re)conceive the nature of the political as 
such, because it seems that there is no way out of violent antagonism as far as the 
construction of social worlds is concerned. The apocalyptic nature of terrorism draws 
these conditions into visibility. Walter Benjamin – certainly writing during an apocalyptic 
moment of state terrorism – argues in his “Critique of Violence” that the violence of the 
political involves at least two elements – lawmaking violence and law-preserving 
violence – both of which are characteristic of militarism, in that militarism “is the 
compulsory, universal use of violence as a means to the ends of the state” (284). In his 
critique, Benjamin problematizes any distinctions between legal violence and war, and 
even between violence itself and the law, because as he says, in so far as violence is used 
for natural ends, “there is inherent in all such violence a lawmaking character” (284). As 
Roberto Esposito claims, Benjamin defines violence as existing neither merely before the 
law nor after the law but as constantly accompanying and constituting the law. Violent 
acts found the law, exclude all forms of violence that exist outside that particular legal 
violence, and go on to enforce that exclusion of illegal violence. He says, “In the final 
analysis, this is what the law is: violence against violence in order to control violence” 
(Immunitas 29). Legality – even liberal legality – is identical with a version of violence, 
and yet liberal democracy addresses violence as that which exists beyond the law, that 
which the law must control through the means of control it has at its disposal, which is, 
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namely, violence. Terrorism, then, can be understood as that form of violence that is 
excluded from a particular delimitation of the law and yet simultaneously challenges the 
control that legal violence would maintain over its domain. 
This notion of terrorism as the free radical element that undermines the system 
while constituting itself outside of it reveals the paradox in the Arendtian totalitarian 
form of terror discussed above. From one vantage point, terror invades the system, 
exploiting a lack of control and provoking a loss of control. From another vantage point, 
however, terror is the control itself. It is the act of establishing and enforcing an identity 
for the political system through violence, which may look like what we automatically 
perceive as the institution and preservation of laws, but it may take on other forms as 
well, which, as Benjamin points out, have no less of a lawmaking character. This paradox 
resolves itself if we view the domain of the political as conditioned upon a violent 
antagonism between competing communities. Chantal Mouffe defines a distinction 
between the political and politics, where the political is “the dimension of hostility and 
antagonism that is an ever-present possibility in all human society, antagonism that can 
take many different forms and emerge in diverse social relations” (“Religion” 323). This 
definition of the political understands the condition of interaction between persons and 
groups as a virtual physics of force relations in which encounter, contestation, and 
violence are inherent to the conditions necessary for particular politics to emerge. Mouffe 
then defines politics as “the ensemble of practices, discourses, and institutions that seek 
to establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence under conditions that are 
always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension of the political” 
(323). Politics constitutes an activity conditioned by the nature of the political out of 
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which the activity occurs. In this framework, politics is necessarily violent because it 
seeks to impose order and unity – a particular regime – onto social existence, thus 
redirecting, eliminating, or suppressing forces that strive toward other potential orders 
excluded by the regime. Therefore, politics takes hold of the means of constituting the 
political community, of defining what is the common sense or the common good of that 
political community, which requires a violent antagonism on a fundamental level 
between differing conceptions of the political community and the political identities of 
citizenship belonging to that community. 
Here I am picking up a further critique of the presumptions of liberal democracy 
that is elaborated by Mouffe in her argument that the idea of “consensus” that grounds 
the possibility of deliberative versions of liberal democracy, as well as the idea of 
“rationality” that makes possible Rawlsian forms of liberal democracy, “is – and will 
always be – the expression of a hegemony and the crystallization of power relations” 
(Democratic Paradox 49). This is because both deliberative “consensus” and Rawlsian 
“rationality” have obscured the preconditions that determine who has access to the public 
sphere wherein political decision-making is purported to occur: all constitutions of a 
public involve a drawing of the boundary between who belongs to that public and can 
affect its decisions and who does not belong, who is the “us” and who is the “them.” 
Mouffe then proposes a more radical conception of democracy that rejects the notion of a 
non-coercive consensus along with the notion of a non-exclusive sphere of rational 
argument (33). With the objectified illusions of citizenship – forms of representation that 
are rooted in a particular construction of the people to whom a political society belongs – 
one faction (or legitimized range of factions, such as in party politics) gains hegemony 
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over others and then, through legal violence, excludes those others from access to the 
public mechanisms of decision, that is, unless they are capable of conforming themselves 
to the sort of political identity around which the system has been constructed. 
Therefore, contrary to the claims of liberalism, terrorism is inherent to 
liberalism’s own mechanisms of establishing and maintaining power because these 
mechanisms involve crucial elements that are at work in the sort of enclosed community-
formation that we have already seen at work in the constitution of Hammad’s community 
of Islamists. In noting such a symmetry here, I question the typical discursive and legal 
manner in which liberalism excludes religion from the work of politics. Most forms of 
modern liberalism rely on some version of political secularism – holding that while 
citizens should be free to practice their various forms of religious devotion in private, 
they are prohibited from attempting to incorporate those religious beliefs or practices into 
the public body of the political structures. American constitutional democracy does this 
explicitly by simultaneously prohibiting the establishment of a state religion while also 
protecting the free exercise of religion. This double-strategy of religious liberty 
legislation receives its coherence only by relying on a strict division between the public 
and private spheres of activity. Mouffe argues, “It is, I submit, the tendency to identify 
politics with the state and the state with the public that has led to the mistaken idea that 
the separation between church and state means the absolute relegation of religion to the 
private” (“Religion” 325). However, such a play of distinction, in its implicit association 
of the state and the public, obscures that secularity itself is a communal value that has no 
necessary rational privilege for its hegemony in law other than a triumph of the forces of 
power that construct the political. Once we accept that liberalism is already founded and 
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enforced by violence, the sin of terrorism from the vantage point of liberalism is not only 
its use of violence against violence but also its spectacular display of forcing private 
values onto the public stage in a way that cannot be controlled by legal violence.3 
This leads me then to define terrorism more centrally neither simply in terms of 
physical violence or affective results, nor in terms of the blurring of private and public 
distinctions (because that is only relevant to terror that acts against liberalism), but in 
terms of how a community forms and immunizes itself against its outside. Esposito casts 
this predicament in a couple of parallel ways in Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of 
Community and Bíos: Biopolitics and Philosophy, respectively. In Communitas, Esposito 
argues for a re-understanding of the way we define the nature of community by, in part, 
turning to its etymology, which involves the adjunction of the Latin words cum, meaning 
“with” or “between,” and munus, which is not a property but rather works as a type of 
donum, or gift. The munus can be understood as a task, a debt, an office to be carried out, 
or an obligation – more specifically, “the obligation that is contracted with respect to the 
other and that invites a suitable release from the obligation. The gratitude that demands 
new donations” (5). Esposito’s framework here understands community as the sharing in 
common of an incompleteness that each owes to the other; in the meeting of the plural, 
the singular individual experiences the interruption of the closure of her identity and so is 
                                                     
3 This is not to say that we do not already see instances of religiously-motivated 
legislation within liberal democracy. For instance, in America the original Defense of 
Marriage Act as well as the various discussions surrounding abortion legislation and, at 
the state level, religious liberty protections of private store owners to turn down clients 
for religious reasons have been pushed by religious communities and are difficult to 
justify on non-religious grounds or grounds that are not based in specific moral systems. 
Instances such as these simply underscore that the hegemony of communities is always 
shifting and renegotiating according to the movements of power. 
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fundamentally not individual. However, an individual or a community acts against this 
necessary interruption of closure when it does seek to define itself around some specified 
common property, origin, and/or destiny. With the negation of this closure, the refusal of 
the gift we owe each other and the lack that we constantly obtain, the cum-munus 
becomes an im-munus – hence, it is immunized. Esposito goes on in Bíos to expound 
upon the biomedical metaphor at play in his theorization of political community, how the 
idea draws together the two poles of biopolitics: biology and politics: 
[T]he category of “immunity,” even in its current meaning, is inscribed 
precisely in their intersection, that is, on the tangential line that links the 
sphere of life with that of law. Where “immunity” for the biomedical 
sphere refers to a condition of natural or induced refractoriness on the part 
of a living organism when faced with a given disease, immunity in 
political-juridical language alludes to a temporary or definitive exemption 
on the part of subject with regard to concrete obligations or 
responsibilities that under normal circumstances would bind one to others. 
[…] Rather than being superimposed or juxtaposed in an external form 
that subjects one to the domination of the other, in the immunitary 
paradigm, bíos and nomos, life and politics, emerge as the two constituent 
elements of a single, indivisible whole that assumes meaning from their 
interrelation. Not simply the relation that joins life to power, immunity is 
the power to preserve life. (45-6) 
In this characterization of immunity, the community, placing itself in a state of exception, 
ingests the disease as a means of paradoxically preserving itself. The disease here, more 
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paradoxically, is life itself, a politics over life in which the political community 
establishes a form of life that then allows them to militarize the protection of that form of 
life. 
The outside of the community (whether or not that outside actually exists through 
figures internal to the territory occupied by the community) that transgresses the 
community’s identity violates the life of the community and therefore must be defended 
against, which was the point of immunizing the community in the first place. The 
immunity is by nature limiting, finite. “Every time that the excess of meaning of a 
community—occupied by its own collective essence—wanted to counter the vacuum of 
sense produced in the individualistic paradigm, the consequences were destructive: first 
with regard to external or internal enemies against which such a community is 
constructed, and second with regard to itself” (Communitas 143). The process of a 
community’s auto-immunization is then destructive in its own acts of constituting itself 
against an outside, in part, because it will always need to excise the excess of its reality 
within its territory. This can provoke a habitual mode of identification that forces the 
political community to constantly increase its policing of itself to root out those elements 
whose identities run antagonistic to the established common properties, the “official” 
form(s) of life. Such a process falls within the logic of Arendtian terror and can lead 
ultimately to just the sort of totalitarian state edifice she describes. 
Still, there is always an excess of reality to an identity of life, however 
constituted. Even the life of a singular individual is never comprehensive, insofar as the 
individual is always an incomplete process produced in the flux of communitas’s constant 
interruption of closure – its infinite openness. The theory of individuation we find in 
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Esposito describes an unending activity of being-with others. The autoimmune 
community attempts to draft a rigid continuity between individuals by establishing a 
common form around certain properties, and yet in doing so, it annihilates the ontological 
giving or obligation that individuals already shared in the first place. Immunity enacts a 
terror on the fundamental condition of being-together that constitutes the multitude. If, 
then, another autoimmune community aggresses against the first one’s form of life 
through an identifiable encounter, which must manifest in violence, the first community 
identifies the encounter as an act of terrorism. We see now, though, that the act of terror 
had already happened – it was the people’s condition of being – and that this violent 
encounter must be understood as a terror against terror: two political constitutions 
seeking a certain life and hegemony, yet in such a way that can only manifest in the death 
of self and other. The asymmetry of power in the situation, as well as the singularity of 
contingencies in the event of the encounter, allows for histories that write the situation as 
an exceptional event, an aggressive act of war, the original moment of a new Age of 
Terror. 
The act of identification constitutes the core of a terroristic encounter: the political 
community identifies itself and, alternatively, identifies the other, the aggressor. There is 
an irony in this identification, however, in that by identifying the other, one fails to see 
them; one sees only the inimical identity. DeLillo draws this catastrophic failure of 
identity to the fore in Falling Man in several ways. For one, the rationality of the suicide 
bombers’ act can be understood as the erasure of the victims through an act of mass 
identification. This is the meaning of Amir’s response to Hammad’s question, “What 
about the others, those who will die?”: “Amir said simply there are no others. The others 
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exist only to the degree that they fill the role we have designed for them. This is their 
function as others. Those who will die have no claim to their lives outside the useful fact 
of their dying” (176). There is a brutal honesty in Amir’s remarks. He acknowledges the 
contradictory identity that their politics ascribes to their victims. On the one hand, these 
people do not exist, since their lives unfold outside the limits of the terroristic imaginary 
framework. On the other hand, their lives are reduced to a specific minimal role: the mere 
fact of dying in the encounter. The view articulated by DeLillo here captures the basic 
fact of the encounter between the community of terror and its enemy: the enemy has no 
claims to life, but a “life” – a determinate form of life – is given them by the community 
of terror. This life is a death because it is defined through negation of the community’s 
own immunized life. What is life to the self is death to the other, unless the other can be 
figured as identical to the self – as in the autoimmunity of the community, or by a process 
of conversion. Abel provides a similar interpretation of the invisibility of the other 
produced through terrorism: “The other bypasses us. The terrorist’s self is non-self-
identical to itself: the I of the self is always already an other” (200). Here, too, the 
community of terror cannot see the other, but as it plots the other’s narrative position in 
the community’s scripted unfolding of life, the invisibility of the other is written as a 
negation of life, as a scripted death. 
What DeLillo’s novel does not allow us, however, is the luxury of confining this 
mode of terror to strictly religious communities and identities. The annihilation of 
identity, in its immunization, shows up as well in the case of the character Martin 
Ridnour, an art dealer and the lover of Lianne’s mother Nina Bartos. It becomes clear in 
Lianne and Nina’s conversations that Martin had lived a past life as a violent political 
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idealist back in Europe. Nina says, “I know one thing. He was a member of a collective in 
the late nineteen sixties. Kommune One. Demonstrating against the German state, the 
fascist state. That’s how they saw it. First they threw eggs. Then they set off bombs. After 
that I’m not sure what he did. I think he was in Italy for a while, in the turmoil, when the 
Red Brigades were active” (146). Nina goes on to say that Martin once owned a wanted 
poster depicting “German terrorists of the early seventies. Nineteen names and faces” 
(147). This image alone draws a congruity between those German political terrorists and 
the Islamist terrorists of the 9/11 attacks, who were also depicted in an infamous poster of 
nineteen names and faces. To further emphasize the similarities between Martin’s acts in 
the past and the suicide bombers, Nina explains Martin’s own sense of complicated 
kinship: “He thinks these people, these jihadists, he thinks they have something in 
common with the radicals of the sixties and seventies. He thinks they’re all part of the 
same classical pattern. They have their theorists. They have their visions of world 
brotherhood” (147). It is key that what unites the communities of Kommune One and the 
Islamist suicide bombers is the ideal of “world brotherhood,” which we can take here to 
mean the expansion of a particular political community – holding to a common bounded 
identity – over the entire globe. While their acts of violence and encounter may 
contingently confine themselves to a specific locale at a given moment, in their nature all 
terroristic identities are global in tendency, due in part to their act of articulating the 
human and life as such. Their teleologies involve a definition of life and a good for the 
life of the community that allows for no fundamental pluralism or dissent. This terrorism 
is an imperialism of identity, a resistance to an identified extant hegemony in some form 
– whether the identified conservatism of Berlin in the sixties and seventies or the 
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identified Western technocracy and militarism at the turn of the 21st century. In both 
cases, a dominant terrorism is countered by an oppositional terrorism of a different form 
in pursuit of the means of reconstituting the domain of politics in which the citizen and 
the good of society are inscribed. Such resistance keeps political actors bound to the 
mechanisms, under a different hue, that create the reigns of terror they abhor. 
Hammad, through his integration into and identification with Amir’s circle, loses 
himself as he becomes part of the community. He dresses himself in the narrative of the 
group, the form of life written into it, determined, with them, “to become one mind. Shed 
everything but the men you are with. […] He was becoming one of them now, learning to 
look like them and think like them. This was inseparable from jihad. He prayed with 
them to be with them. They were becoming total brothers” (83). The process of 
individuation as described by Esposito, by which an individual is constantly undone 
through the obligatory sharing among others in the relation of communitas, is turned 
inside out. The closure of identity that blocks the interruption of an individual’s always 
unfinished becoming rejects the individual, as though a graft that was sutured to patch an 
open wound had rejected the host. The sutured identity, by closing in Hammad against 
the community’s outside, takes him over, washes him in the identity of the group, and he 
becomes finally the proprium that they share – “[E]ach man becomes the other, and the 
other still another, and then there is no separation” (80). Hammad becomes lost in the life 
of the community; he becomes dead to himself. “He was not here, it was not him” (175). 
Here again the symmetry between the terrorism of Hammad and of Martin Ridnour 
emerges in the loss of self, the self’s reconstitution as other. Nina confesses to Lianne the 
secret that she knows: Martin’s name is Ernst Hechinger (148). The question of names 
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recurs throughout the novel, the question of false names and real identities, names 
ascribed to others, how one is named, and how one (re)names oneself. Joseph M. Conte 
describes this name-swapping in the novel as a “metanomasia” that consists of the 
transferal of names between recognized mass murderers and familiar figures in order to 
destabilize our presumptuousness regarding such constitutive distinctions (570). I will 
return to this theme of destabilizing our acts of recognition in my discussion of the 
aesthetic terrorism that the novel performs. While we might want to consider “Ernst 
Hechinger” as Martin’s real or true name – and “Martin Ridnour” as a reformed fiction – 
I would argue that Hechinger became Martin’s false name when, in the community of 
terror, he learned to identify himself with the violent political goals of the group. Like 
Hammad, he would have washed himself in the life of the community such that he 
became dead to himself. He is the art dealer, the lover of Nina, formerly known as the 
terrorist Ernst Hechinger, but Ernst Hechinger is dead now. In the scheme of political 
terror, individual identity always tends toward a suicide at the hands of the community 
that encloses the self. 
Nina’s revelation to Lianne provokes a crucial recognition for Lianne that directs 
our attention to the terror that this novel performs: “She wanted to punish her mother but 
not for Martin or not just for that. It was nearer and deeper and finally about one thing 
only. This is what everything was about, who they were, the fierce clasp, like hands 
bound in prayer, now and evermore” (148, emphasis added). The revelation that Martin 
was once another man known as Ernst Hechinger is an apocalyptic intervention for 
Lianne: it reveals something greater about the background condition of her own identity, 
of her common identity with her mother, of the interrelation of all identities in a shared 
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space. The small revelation of the changed name provokes them to ask a larger question 
about who they were. This is a question that the novel continues to trouble as it enacts its 
own apocalyptic terror, exploding the conditions for identity-formation while 
simultaneously working to make visible the very mechanisms that drive the formation of 
identity and political community. 
 
“The awful openness of it”: An Aesthetics of Terror 
 
The terroristic encounter is constantly present in the text, not merely in its 
ongoing string of effects in the lives of the characters but also in DeLillo’s insistence that 
we continue to confront the terror as an act that constantly reemerges. As noted by John 
N. Duvall and Robert P. Marzec in their introduction to a special issue of Modern Fiction 
Studies on the topic of the literature of 9/11, much of the scholarly conversation so far 
regarding Falling Man, as well as other literature about 9/11, has thematized the event of 
9/11 as a traumatic encounter (395-6). The goal in such analyses is often to discover in 
what ways the collective identity of post-9/11 America is shaped by this trauma, and the 
conclusion seems to be that the novel either fails to give an adequate account of the 
traumatic event or provokes trauma in such a way that removes the possibility for gaining 
a new understanding of what it means to belong to a collective American identity 
following the attacks. As an example of the first conclusion, Richard Gray argues that 
rather than robustly articulating the particular melancholia that followed the 9/11 attacks, 
Falling Man is “immured in the melancholic state, offering a vernal equivalent of 
immobility, that it is symptom rather than diagnosis” (28). Gray argues that, rather than 
 28 
truly confronting the traumatic event, Falling Man resorts to the depiction of characters 
who, in their recourse to familiar structures, seek to domesticate the trauma, thereby 
assimilating it into habitual modes of being. Duvall himself, on the other hand, argues 
that the novel, rather than reveling in trauma, provokes it as a means to point out art’s 
limitations to mediate trauma. The adequate aesthetic mediation of trauma will reveal 
both the impossibility of predicting the ways individuals will respond to trauma’s 
mediation and the incommensurability of individual and collective responses to trauma. 
Duvall asserts that Falling Man’s performance of trauma offers us “a partial glimpse into 
trauma’s unknowing” (“Witnessing Trauma” 168). While Duvall rightly raises the point 
that the deconstructive function of the encounter with terrorism in the novel should be 
looked at as a valuable function of the work, both critics presume that the significance of 
the novel rests in what it does not or cannot reveal.  
For these critics, the novel at best points out the lie in the consolations we find 
following a traumatic event. It is worth considering, however, Nietzsche’s aphorism, 
“Even when the mouth lies, the way it looks still tells the truth” (Basic Writings 282). I 
will argue that, in pointing out the forms such consolations take, the novel reveals the 
functional mechanisms that make up the field within which both terror and response to 
terror precipitate. What DeLillo accomplishes in Falling Man is a shift from viewing 
terrorism as an isolated encounter toward a view that describes terrorism as a structural 
component of power that constitutes the encounter as such between an immunized us and 
them – between an enclosed I and an identified you. This interpretation does not valorize 
the role of empathy as, for instance, Mary Manjikian does in arguing that the novel works 
to put “a human face on the tragedy” by “seeking to make rational that which previously 
 29 
was simply condemned” (301). Rather, the novel serves to problematize the means by 
which we establish empathy in the act of identifying (with) another, even while forcing 
us to confront the interiority of the terrorists. Additionally, through his use of the Falling 
Man performance artist, identified after his death as the actor David Janiak, DeLillo 
introduces into the text an aesthetic form of the terroristic encounter that captures the 
aesthetic element of violence in suicide terrorism and the horror it provokes in a helpless 
audience unable to evade the encounter. As an aesthetic terrorism that is also apocalyptic, 
this violence both proliferates through the effects of the encounter while simultaneously 
revealing the already extant and diffusive mechanics of violence that it functions within 
and against. 
While the Falling Man performance artist maintains little impact on the drama 
unfolding between Lianne and Keith in the wake of 9/11, the Falling Man as a motif 
alerts us to the central explicative work being done by the novel with regard to the 
terroristic functioning of identity, as well as terrorism’s effect on the identities of the 
spectators. Lianne encounters the Falling Man twice through the course of the novel, the 
first time at 42nd Street, looking out from Grand Central Station: “A man was dangling 
there, above the street, upside down. He wore a business suit, one leg bent up, arms at his 
sides. A safety harness was barely visible, emerging from his trousers at the straightened 
leg and fastened to the decorative rail of the viaduct” (33). Lianne has heard of this 
performance artist, who suspends himself at various locations throughout the city in the 
pose of the falling man from the famous Associated Press photograph taken by Richard 
Drew. The Falling Man forces upon his spectators a horrific image associated with the 
attacks on the World Trade Center in such a way that they cannot evade responding yet 
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again to that event they wish to place in the past, a time that precedes everything that is 
now marked by after: “He brought it back, of course, those stark moments in the burning 
towers when people fell or were forced to jump” (33). The Falling Man presents the 
event of terror, and in doing so, he exerts an aesthetic form of violence that produces 
affects in onlookers that they had associated with the spectacle of that Tuesday morning 
in September. The bystanders despise the artist, while Lianne considers the aesthetic 
nature of his act: “There were people shouting up at him, outraged at the spectacle, the 
puppetry of human desperation, a body’s last fleet breath and what it held. It held the 
gaze of the world, she thought. There was the awful openness of it, something we’d not 
seen, the single falling figure that trails a collective dread, body come down among us 
all” (33). The Falling Man manipulates the response of the spectators as in a “puppetry of 
human desperation” – or we might say he conducts them, orchestrates their response, a 
framing made even more poignant by his having attempted another “performance” inside 
a concert hall before being escorted out by the police. He accomplishes this effect not by 
administering some order on the elements at play in the space, as when a conductor 
guides the various instruments to a harmonious sound, but by demolishing the conditions 
of order, however fragile they had already become. The “awful openness” of the Falling 
Man is within the nature of terrorism as we know it: the eruption of closure, the 
fracturing of the illusions of sense administered by our reality-creating perceptual 
mechanisms. The body falls through the air in a manner that the people could not have 
experienced but by being present to the spectacle on that Tuesday morning, and in 
reintroducing them to that cataclysmic image, the question of bodies, the world, and 
collectivity is opened again, like a wound. 
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The orchestration of dread by the Falling Man affirms Asad’s remarks on the 
singular horror that accompanies the West’s encounter with suicide terrorism. Asad 
argues that horror, as an affective response, is unlike terror or vengeance in that “horror 
has no object” (68). Horror evades the logic of plots and recognition and instead 
destabilizes the very condition for establishing such logics at all. While terror, as a form 
of fear, may establish an identifiable danger to life, horror obstructs our capacity to 
identify the danger and so also to demarcate the boundaries of the self or the collective: 
“Horror explodes the imaginary, the space within which the flexible persona 
demonstrates to itself its identity” (68-9). Suicide terrorism provokes horror in part 
because the perpetrator’s decision to terminate his own life along with that of his victims 
goes against our basic assumptions about the corporeal limits of the self: “One is 
presented here not just with a scene of death and wounding but with a confounding of the 
body’s shapes. It is as though the familiar, reassuring face of a friend had disintegrated 
before one’s eyes” (70). Asad’s explanation follows the account of a suicide bombing at a 
pizza parlor in Jerusalem, with descriptions of charred flesh, alien disembodied limbs, 
and the bomber’s rigid head laying detached on the street. We find an acceleration of this 
effect in the attacks on 9/11 with the bodies apparently dematerialized, commingled 
within each other and in the atmosphere. DeLillo presents his own explication of such a 
confounding of corporeal boundaries in the talk of “organic shrapnel” by one of the 
EMTs assisting Keith following the collapse of the towers: 
“Where there are suicide bombings. Maybe you don’t want to hear 
this.” 
 “I don’t know.” 
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 “In those places where it happens, the survivors, the people nearby 
who are injured, sometimes, months later, they develop bumps, for lack of 
a better term, and it turns out this is caused by small fragments, tiny 
fragments of the suicide bomber’s body. The bomber is blown to bits, 
literally bits and pieces, and fragments of flesh and bone come flying 
outward with such force and velocity that they get wedged, they get 
trapped in the body of anyone who’s in striking range. Do you believe it? 
A student is sitting in a café. She survives the attack. Then, months later, 
they find these little, like, pellets of flesh, human flesh that got driven into 
the skin. They call this organic shrapnel.” (16) 
Such a phenomenon is certainly horrifying as the attacker and the victim lose any 
physical means of differentiation following the encounter. While the victim may desire to 
interpret this as a host-and-contagion relationship, the distinction between the flesh of the 
one and of the other is too difficult to precisely ascertain. 
As a consequence of the suicide bombing, the victims and the attackers become a 
chaotic, disorganized mesh of tissue, which is further emphasized in Lianne’s revelation 
as she washes Keith upon his return to their home: “There was more blood than she 
realized at first and then she began to realize something else, that his cuts and abrasions 
were not severe enough or numerous enough to account for all this blood. Most of it 
came from somebody else” (88). Keith’s blood is mixed with the blood of the other 
victims he was in contact with as they were all subjected to a violent contact with the 
terrorists who had deemed all of their lives as plotted for sacrifice. The terrorism of the 
autoimmune community, as explained above, involves a particular constitution of life that 
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necessarily precludes the visibility and preservation of other lives: all lives beyond the 
community are constituted by the community as death, as the negation of life. 
Furthermore, a crucial aspect of the manner in which political identities are confounded 
in the self-sacrifice of the suicide bombers as well as their identification of the victims as 
sacrificial subjects correlates with a Judeo-Christian religious discourse of the sacrifice 
that relies on a coincidence of life and blood. The Law of Moses, inscribed in the Torah, 
administers a prohibition against ingesting blood while allowing for the shedding of 
blood in sacrifice. 4 As the traditional Jewish laws were adapted and transformed in 
meaning through the institutionalization of Christianity following the death of Christ, this 
prohibition on ingesting blood still remained, as evidenced by the decision at the Council 
at Jerusalem.5 In Christian theology, as well as in Jewish theology, the locus of life, or the 
vital principle, is in the blood of an organism. It is forbidden to eat blood, to take from a 
living body into another living body in order to obtain life (a practice that carries 
resonances from pagan animisms), and yet the spilled blood may be used symbolically to 
cover a body in propitiation for sins he has committed. 
While explicating a rationality behind the moral and juridical commandments of 
these religious traditions may be considered to be futile or even sacrilegious, perhaps we 
                                                     
4 If anyone of the house of Israel or of the aliens who reside among them eats any blood, I 
will set my face against that person who eats blood, and will cut that person off from the 
people. For the life of the flesh is in the blood; and I have given it to you for making 
atonement for your lives on the altar; for, as life, it is the blood that makes atonement. For 
the life of every creature—its blood is its life; therefore I have said to the people of Israel: 
You shall not eat the blood of any creature, for the life of every creature is its blood; 
whoever eats it shall be cut off. (Lev. 17:10-11, 14) 
5 The Apostle Peter declares, “Therefore I have reached the decision that we should not 
trouble those Gentiles who are turning to God, but we should write to them to abstain 
only from things polluted by idols and from fornication and from whatever has been 
strangled and from blood” (Acts 15:19-20). 
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can say that, in this framework, a life identical to one organism may not be ingested to 
serve the life of another organism as the commingling of lives creates a conflict of 
identity, particularly given a sacred ontology that establishes the identity of the human as 
fundamentally distinct from other organisms. This common identity coalesces around a 
specifically substitutionary model of the sacrifice to atone for an individual’s breaking of 
the law. In Christian theological iteration, the cost of breaking the law of the community 
is death, but the gift that God has given through the substitution of Christ as atonement 
for the breaking of that law is a life that exceeds mortal life.6 While the law-breaker 
becomes identified with the sacrificial organism in some way, paradoxically, the 
sacrificial organism is taken to be, in some sense, the immortal sovereign himself who is 
understood as the original legislating authority behind the law. The one enacting the 
death is the one receiving it as well, which is the same logic at play in the immunization 
of a community but transmitted onto the singular figure of the God-man. Esposito writes, 
“The identification of the victim with his own persecutor marks the height of a sacrificial 
mechanism set in motion originally by mimetic desire and subsequently institutionalized 
in the political exchange between protection and obedience” (Communitas 33). As a 
mechanism of preserving itself, the community constructs prohibitions on praxis that 
define the limits of its identity, which then allows the community to institutionalize this 
definition in violent forms of security. This means that, fundamental to the Western 
Christian theology of community, those who belong to the people of God – and not to its 
outside, where there is weeping and gnashing of teeth – give their lives over, first, to a 
                                                     
6 “For the wages of sin is death, but the free gift of God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our 
Lord” (Romans 6:23). 
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law with which they cannot live in accordance but that binds the community and, 
subsequently, to a total identification with the figure of the transcendent sovereign who is 
taken to legislate the moral teleology of the sect, as well as the eschatology of the world. 
“For through the law I died to the law, so that I might live to God. I have been crucified 
with Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me. […]” (Gal. 19-
20). The individual is absorbed into the community through the community’s total 
identification with the sacrificed sovereign. 
The point this excursus on a theology of the sacrifice drives at is that fundamental 
to the Western framework for thinking identity, blood, and life is a two-fold idea. On the 
one hand, the life and identity of an organism is located in the blood of that organism; on 
the other hand, the life of the community may preserve itself through an act of common 
identification through the medium of sacrificial blood. This transferal of identity through 
an exchangeability of blood lies within the logic of the West’s conditions of identity-
formation, particularly as this formation occurs as a process of the self-constitution and 
immunization of the political community. Asad draws out the paradoxical implications of 
the role of the sacrifice in Western Judeo-Christian political theologies of the sacrifice in 
ways that link up with the complication of identity that occurs in terrorism and, more 
specifically, in suicide terrorism. At the heart of Western civilization, he argues, hovers 
the arguably most famous suicide in history: the willing submission of Christ to his 
crucifixion by the Roman governing authorities. Through the blood logic of 
substitutionary atonement, Christ’s death represented the deaths of those who had broken 
the law. Therefore, in identifying with Christ through his choice to die, all who belong to 
the community have their blood-debt paid in full, and they take on a new identity – a new 
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life – within the suicide that founds the community. As Asad puts it, “In short, in 
Christian civilization, the gift of life for humanity is possible only through a suicidal 
death; redemption is dependent on cruelty or at least on the sin of disregarding life” (86). 
I would develop Asad’s point that Christ was the original suicide bomber of the West, 
then, to say that Christ pursued the most drastic means necessary in order to achieve a life 
upon which the coming community could be founded: a life achieved through death. 
The substitutionary model of sacrifice translates into a form of terror within 
liberal democracies insofar as liberal democracy predicates its own political identity upon 
the exchangeability of blood. Death is in the service of life: the community makes it 
possible ideologically to preserve itself through the death of its own members because 
their blood can be exchanged for the maintenance of the group. So long as the bloodshed 
fortifies the continuity of group identity, the bloodshed is not marked as a loss but as a 
gain. Esposito writes, “Sacrificing life to its preservation is the only way of containing 
the threat that menaces life. Yet this is the equivalent of preserving and perpetuating as 
well life’s capacity to be sacrificed; to ‘normalize’ the possibility if not the reality, of its 
sacrifice” (Communitas 33). The life of a community founded on death sets up life within 
the community as precarious. The violence of the state towards its citizens has the 
capacity, in such communities, to be done in the name of those citizens – such is the cruel 
irony of contemporary political representation in republican democracies. Here we see 
clear manifestations of the manner in which immunity doubles back on itself, an imbibing 
of the virus in an effort to inoculate oneself against the same virus. Alternatively, to 
slightly mix the metaphor, the blood logic of sacrifice sutures the wound in the openness 
of identity by establishing a political citizenship that, while blocking the wound against 
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infection, nevertheless paradoxically allows for the draining of that body’s blood in 
service of other bodies identifiable under the same terms of citizenship. The same logic 
drives the discourse of “just war” in America, as discussed above, and the nobility 
applied to citizens who choose to enlist in the military, placing themselves in a precarious 
openness to being sacrificed for the preservation of the community. We see this also in 
the legal protection of police officers, as agents of the state, to kill civilians, even in many 
cases in which this killing was not in response to a direct threat. Moreover, we see this in 
other forms of political violence, such as functions in the mass criminalization and 
incarceration (predominantly of African-Americans) in recent decades, whereby 
multitudes of citizens have the privileges of citizenship revoked– such as voting for 
government officials who will represent them in public decisions – and are transferred 
into facilities that are, for all intents and purposes, removed from the public life of the 
political community. These citizens are virtually dead to the community. They are placed 
in locations that, while geographically internal to the community, are yet treated as 
outside of that community’s common public. 
The violence of the political manifests itself in the community’s legislative act of 
legitimizing the violence it does against itself in the constitution and maintenance of 
itself. We have already seen the terror that this amounts to when the community is put 
into conflict with another differently constituted community. Here we see the way suicide 
might be deemed redemptive (regardless of whether or not the bodily victim of the 
suicide chose the death or not, it is suicide because it is a citizen’s death in service to the 
nation). The exchangeability of blood may become, then, not only a logic of 
identification but also an imperative of life in the community. DeLillo gives voice to this 
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idea through the Islamist cell in Falling Man: “Become each other’s running blood” 
(83).7 Terrorism, in the militarized establishment of an inside- and an outside-to-the 
community, is an act that founds the political community. And yet, in the Arendtian form 
of totalitarian terror that we have seen in Hammad’s cadre, in the Christian imperative to 
become “living sacrifices” to Christ,8 and in Western liberalism’s sanctioning of the 
sacrifice of its members to the preservation of the community against threats both foreign 
and domestic, “terror” names the subsuming of self-sovereignty or autonomy under the 
rule of a totalizing identity. Suicide terror, then, is the giving over of one’s life to the 
community one aims to found – hence another iteration of the immunitary paradox: the 
death of identity occurs precisely when identity is being most quintessentially 
established. 
When David Janiak performs his provocative repetition of the encounter with 
suicide terrorism, he assumes the identity of a recognizable and yet unknown victim of 
the attacks. He takes on the pose of a man in flight toward his inevitable death and yet 
suspends it in a spectacle of permanent flight, of a falling that never consummates in 
death. The spectacle is a complicated one, as onlookers are outraged at the cruelty of his 
                                                     
7 It may be that DeLillo is here imputing a specifically Western principle of the 
exchangeability of blood to the worldview of the Islamist terrorists, particularly since the 
substitutionary model of atonement, in its Christian iteration, seems to rely on a Western 
discourse of legality, of guilt and innocence as ascribed to a legal subject whose identity 
is located in the blood. If such a Western ascription does not fit the cultures from which 
Hammad and Amir derive their political theologies, then the ascription here reinforces 
the point that the political community fails to imagine those who exist beyond it except 
insofar as they are plotted through a sanctioned figuration derived from the logic of the 
community’s immunized logic. 
8 “I appeal to you therefore, brothers and sisters, by the mercies of God, to present your 
bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your spiritual worship” 
(Romans 12:1). 
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thrusting back upon them their initial horror. And yet, Janiak presents to them the figure 
they had learned to identify themselves with: the victim, the America that had been 
violated, the one for whom they would allow themselves to grieve because he belonged 
among them. The United States remembered images such as this one – but most 
predominantly this image – in an effort to preserve themselves after 9/11 as the victims of 
an illegitimate violence. In this way, the nation produced a preservation of life – by 
means of legitimizing military violence against those identified with the terroristic threat 
to life, as observed in the United States Congress’s nearly immediate authorization of the 
use of force in retaliation for the attacks – through an idolization of the image of the 
Falling Man, their totem of the America that will never forget. And yet, Janiak’s 
performance piece is received as an act of terror, with horror and with outrage. 
The figure with whom the spectators had once identified, as victims of terror, is 
now identified with the perpetrators of terror, a substitution that is underscored through 
Lianne’s descriptions of the man the second time she encounters him, this time near the 
maintenance platform of an elevated railway track. Every description draws a symmetry 
to tropes we associate with terrorists, and yet there is a touch of defamiliarization as well: 
“Falling Man was known to appear among crowds or at sites where crowds might quickly 
form. Here was an old derelict rolling a wheel down the street. Here was a woman in a 
window, having to ask who he was” (164). The scene is treated as an entirely local 
phenomenon, something new and unpredictable and yet for which there are ill-fitting 
generic categories that might be applied. By constructing a performance that evokes 
tropes of terror while also revealing those tropes to be too reductive, DeLillo directly 
complicates our habitual mechanisms of recognition: 
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There was one thing for them to say, essentially. Someone falling. 
Falling man. She wondered if this was his intention, to spread the word 
this way, by cell phone, intimately, as in the towers and in the hijacked 
planes. 
Or she was dreaming his intentions. She was making it up, 
stretched so tight across the moment that she could not think her own 
thoughts. (165) 
In blocking Lianne’s struggle to set the event before her eyes into a narrative defined by 
intentionality, her facility to establish terms of recognition fall away into the singularity 
of a situation that belongs to no known properties. The failure of recognition here rebuts 
Graley Herren’s treatment of the image of the Falling Man as an empty receptacle 
allowing Lianne to mediate a process of understanding however particularly suited to her 
needs. Against Herren’s claim that images, as observed in the novel, “contain the power 
to anticipate or even dictate our sense of identity, how we locate ourselves in the world” 
– in addition to our own capacity “to appropriate images to serve our needs” (165) – this 
scene shows us the fundamentally deconstructive and non-instrumentalizable function the 
image of the suicide terrorist performs for spectators. The recursion of identity taking 
place in the Falling Man’s performance confounds all capacity to make sense of the 
event, and this, we might say, is the case with all immediate moments of suicide 
terrorism. The only consistent sense we can make of such events is the resolution that 
there can be no sense made, no resolution arrived at. In this sense, I agree with Duvall 
that “witnessing Falling Man’s full performance is not a representation of the horror of 
9/11, it is the horror of 9/11 itself” (“Fiction and 9/11” 186). And yet, I would clarify that 
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this is not the horror of 9/11, despite its intertextual connection, but rather that this 
interpellation of a well-known image from the original fall of the World Trade Center 
towers into a new setting, experienced in its immediacy, makes the event its own terrorist 
attack. Despite the natural tendencies of our recognitive reflexes, this is something 
singularly new, experienced as its own specific terroristic violence.  
Lianne remarks on this process of confrontation as it takes place in the reaction of 
another bystander: “His face showed an intense narrowing of thought and possibility. He 
was seeing something elaborately different from what he encountered step by step in the 
ordinary run of hours. He had to learn how to see it correctly, find a crack in the world 
where it might fit” (168). This response arises from the imprint of the inherent terror of 
the political that, in constructing a sense of unified identity of life for the community, 
orients around a particular construction of the world that runs according to its own logic. 
There will be no crack in the world into which an encounter such as this fits, in its 
immediacy, because the very activity of the encounter produces cracks in the world and, 
in doing so, brings the construction of the world out of the obscured background back 
into view. The world is unmade, laid bare and raw, for a moment, until the immunitary 
reflexes provoke us to suture the opened wound. Lianne herself recognizes her inability 
to recognize, despite her desire to do so: 
She wished she could believe this was some kind of antic street theater, an 
absurdist drama that provokes onlookers to share a comic understanding of 
what is irrational in the great schemes of being or in the next small 
footstep. 
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 This was too near and deep, too personal. All she wanted to share 
was a look, catch someone’s eye, see what she herself was feeling. She did 
not think of walking away. He was right above her but she wasn’t 
watching and wasn’t walking away. She looked at the teacher across the 
street […] (163) 
Her description shows that even an aesthetic genre invented to capture that which 
disobeys the normative conventions of plot and order – that is, absurdism – fails to 
capture the sense of the terroristic act, which is by definition senseless at the moment of 
its eruption. The defamiliarizing effect of the nearness and non-reductive quality of the 
event recursively deconstructs the conditions for recognition, such that the woman in the 
window has to ask who this “known” figure was, and Lianne feels as though she could 
not think thoughts that were identifiably her own. Perhaps in thinking the thought that her 
thoughts are not her own, she does indeed think an immediate, genuinely personal 
thought; the encounter provokes her to think her inability to rely on habitual patterns of 
thought. 
 However, Lianne’s first response is to remain at the ground zero of the encounter 
and, instead of watching the performance above, to turn her gaze to those bystanders with 
whom she shares the encounter without a common understanding. The significance of 
this narrative gesture captures the aesthetic-terroristic function of the novel itself: it is an 
act that draws the latent background conditions of the social world into visibility through 
the eruption of an encounter unaccounted for by the logics of that world. More precisely, 
following Sloterdijk’s theory of “atmoterrorism,” the novel’s act of terror involves the 
explication of the latent conditions for life, which I have been taking to be part and parcel 
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of the activity of political identity-formation. The posed body in free-fall, appearing like 
a contagion unexpectedly throughout the city, disrupts the processes of collective 
identification underway throughout the city and the nation in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, while drawing into an “awful openness” the mechanisms of visual recognition 
and the symbolisms of blood by which citizens identify one another. Symmetrically, 
DeLillo’s novel more broadly draws into an “awful openness” a variety of elements at 
work in the ecology of political community-formation that have always functioned in the 
background, though perhaps previously ignored. We have seen some of these elements at 
play in the formation of Amir’s sect: the sharing of a close space, the identification 
through mythic narratives, and the practicing of ritualistic communal norms. DeLillo sifts 
these elements out of the general imbroglio of social forces for distinct explication, as a 
meteorologist might separate wind speed from barometric pressure and from moisture 
content in the atmosphere. Our habitual modes of thinking about the social world, or the 
interplay of politics, religion, and community, may tend to flatten distinctions between 
each of these mechanisms of force – just as our habitual modes of thinking about the 
weather often favors a general impression of current conditions over a scientific 
explication of the different elements that must function together to produce the particular 
atmosphere that we walk through. The elements at play in community-formation, in their 
unexplicated flattening, are taken to be cultural givens. However, Sloterdijk argues that in 
the modern era unfolding from that initial moment of atmospheric terrorism at Ypres 
Salient, these givens have “moved over to the side of the represented, the objective, the 
elaborated, and the producible” (107). Terrorism, as a form of power, “explicates the 
environment from the aspect of its vulnerability” (107). Therefore, DeLillo’s novel, as an 
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act of aesthetic terrorism, not only thematizes the instantiation of terror that precipitates 
out of the violence of the political but also examines the elements in the social-political 
environment that make the environment vulnerable to precipitations of terrorism. The 
vulnerability is suggested through the symmetry between these elements, when occurring 
in situations not typically associated with terrorism, and their appearance among Amir 
and Hammad’s cadre. 
 The element of sharing a close space appears as one force at work in constellating 
individuals into closed communities in response to fears of alterity outside the space. This 
shows up, first, in the fact that Keith, following the apocalyptic moment of the attacks, 
attempts to exit the ruptured space he had been occupying – which was “not a street 
anymore but a world, a time and space of falling ash and near night” (3) – by retreating to 
the last space of intimacy he had known: his home with Lianne. After the two have spent 
some time together again, Lianne remarks on Keith’s motives for remaining there (with 
some doubt as to the truth of her understanding), “This is where he wanted to be, outside 
the tide of voices and faces, God and country, sitting alone in still rooms, with those 
nearby who mattered” (20). Lianne’s explanation suggests that the return to the intimate 
community of a close, shared space is pursued as an attempted retreat or exodus from the 
broader collective responses to the catastrophe circulating through the political 
atmosphere. It is the retreat to something known and valued, something constitutive of 
shared memory, away from the larger processes of constructing shared knowledge and 
value in response to the apocalyptic event. Alternatively, Keith also becomes connected 
with Florence Givens, another survivor of the tower’s collapse. The two share several 
intimate conversations in Florence’s apartment across the park, to the point where Keith 
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feels with her as “double in himself, coming and going, the walks across the park and 
back, the deep shared self” (157). He ends his visits to Florence in order to return “to 
safety and family, to the implications of one’s conduct” (157). Here Keith develops 
Lianne’s explanation: he chooses the familiarity of his old life with Lianne and their son 
Justin as a sense of safety in response to safety’s rupture. But it may also be added that 
this retreat involves a safeguard on dividing himself, or sharing himself, too plurally. It is 
the retreat to a community, the consolidation of a self he once had known in a space that 
was familiar. 
 Two other spaces that become crucial loci for the explication of other elements at 
play in community-formation are, for Lianne, the weekly storyline sessions she leads in 
East Harlem as a therapy group for people in the early stages of Alzheimer’s and, for 
Keith, the space of the poker table. The power of these spaces unfolds distinctly for Keith 
and Lianne, respectively, because following the attacks, the regular poker games ended, 
partly due to the deaths of some the players, “but the sessions took on a measure of 
intensity” (29). The storyline sessions are devoted to the practice of writing memory into 
narrative, as the participants reach into themselves to capture narrative truths about their 
lives. This space, while not obviously religious in its essential definition, functions much 
like a religious space of self-constitution. The practice of writing memory into narrative 
as an exertion of authority over one’s life works as a sort of individualized myth-making: 
“They signed their pages with first name and first letter of last name. This was Lianne’s 
idea, maybe a little affected, she thought, as if they were characters in European novels. 
They were characters and authors both, able to tell what they wished, cradle the rest in 
silence” (30). The storyline sessions offer an explicit case of the conscious construction 
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of narrative meaning as an act of control, to shape a life into an order, to make sense of it 
as a defense against the disorder of the world and the deterioration of individual memory. 
This practice is similar to religious references to authority in an effort to establish 
narrative truth, as in the veneration of sacred texts or mythologies: “This was their prayer 
room, said Omar H. They summoned the force of final authority. No one knew what they 
knew, here in the last clear minute before it all closed down” (30). These lines figure the 
therapeutic practices of geriatric patients in a way that sounds much like the 
eschatological assurance of the suicide terrorists: the possession of unique knowledge, 
hidden from others, backed by a final authority. It is the rigorous establishment of a 
plotted identity as a preparation for the dissolution of identity, achieved differently in 
either case, but nonetheless clarifying the narrative practices and assumptions involved in 
the constitution of identity. 
 The practices surrounding Keith’s poker table, even in retrospect, also run 
symmetrical to ways we might understand religious community-formation. However, if 
the storyline sessions parallel the interior means by which individuals grapple with 
identity-unto-death, the poker games parallel the formal aspects of religious practice that 
structure groups liturgically. The description of the games’ changes over time reads as a 
satire of religious reform, how play and experimentation solidifies into enforced praxis: 
“The banning of certain games started as a joke in the name of tradition and self-
discipline but became effective over time, with arguments made against the shabbier 
aberrations” (96). Over time the players prohibit various versions of the game, “and with 
the shrinking of choice came the raising of stakes” (97). They also prohibit food at the 
games, as well as all any liquors that are not dark in color. The practices evince the 
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gradual development of a self-imposed ascetic discipline that reinforces the sense of 
grave ceremony surrounding the games, despite the practices’ origins in playfulness. The 
community that forms around the poker table is characterized as resulting from “the 
transcendent effects of unremarkable habit” (99). The outlier among the group is Terry 
Cheng – an outlier not because he questions the play of disciplines but because the 
players are not disciplined enough in their approach to the game: “They enjoyed doing 
this, most of them. They liked creating a structure out of willful trivia. But not Terry 
Cheng, who played the sweetest game of poker, who played online at times for twenty 
hours straight. Terry Cheng said they were shallow people leading giddy lives” (98). 
Amid this satirical portrait of poker as religious ritual, Terry Cheng appears as a zealot, 
one who commits wholly to the game and evaluates others based on their commitment to 
the game. In this way, DeLillo constructs a symmetry between Terry Chang’s statement 
to the group and Amir’s statements to Hammad – both figures remark on the need for the 
others to become more serious in their commitment to the practices of the community, to 
identify more wholly with the practices that define their common identity. 
 After the attacks, and following some months spent with Lianne, Keith returns to 
poker, though this time at high-stakes tournaments in various cities. The former games 
became impossible after the attacks, and with the loss of the ceremony that bound them to 
each other, the players found they had nothing in common anymore: “There was nothing 
left, it seemed, to say about the others in the game, lost and injured, and there was no 
general subject they might comfortably summon. Poker was the one code they shared and 
that was over now” (129). However, it would seem that Keith’s return to the game of 
poker reveals that the former practices had left a certain imprint on him, that the game’s 
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absence drew out the lack of a property around which he had once constituted himself in 
common with certain others. The others have gone away, and he feels the loss of the 
shared game. When he returns to poker, the game takes on a stronger significance: “In 
about the seventy-seventh game of hold ‘em, he began to sense a life in all this, not for 
himself but the others, a small dawn of tunneled meaning” (189). He identifies a larger 
community constructed around this game, the manner in which the practice and 
community of the game itself constructs a life for these others. Much like the totalitarian 
terror involved in the above discussion of communities of terror, the poker game becomes 
a closed and all-consuming space for these others: “This was never over. That was the 
point. There was nothing outside the game but faded space. She blinked and called, 
blinked and folded” (189). The game offers a wholly ritualistic space, casting an 
invisibility on anything beyond it. 
Aaron DeRosa argues that the enclosed world of the poker game reveals a 
recourse to a “homogenous empty time” of undifferentiated experience in response to the 
apocalyptic cataclysm of 9/11, the privileging of “an eternal presentism that negates the 
authority of the past and future” (55). He raises an incisive point about the nature of a 
particularly financial-capitalist narrative taking hold in post-9/11 America – a narrative 
that is rather a non-narrative, a happening that disavows material consequence, the 
constant activity of the gambler with disregard for futures or traditions except insofar as 
they serve the present flow of finance. While DeRosa’s account takes into consideration 
the (non-)values that govern in the American “counter-narrative” to 9/11, it is yet 
important to note the mechanism of other sorts of forces at work in the production of such 
narratives. Keith ultimately absorbs himself into this game and the life it produces, 
 49 
perhaps as a negation of a broader sense of global time and history, as the evasion of 
events as such, but the high-stakes games pick up where his former constitutive 
community dissipated in the wake of the attacks: “He was fitting into something that was 
made to his shape. He was never more himself than in these rooms […] These were the 
times when there was nothing outside, no flash of history or memory that he might 
unknowingly summon in the routine run of cards” (225). In these games, Keith retrieves a 
formal property around which he had constituted his life; only in this case, he gives 
himself more wholly over to the totalitarian form. In a certain sense, he enacts a “return 
to normalcy” in the wake of a nation caught up in global chaos. But this normalcy is a 
nationalism of form, brought near to the ritual movements of his own body, the limits of 
his particular life: “[H]e hadn’t known until now, looking at that vast band of trembling 
desert neon, how strange a life he had been living. But only from here, out away from it. 
In the thing itself, down close, in the tight eyes around the table, there was nothing that 
was not normal” (227). Here he slips away from his life with Lianne, which has become 
strange in the light of a stronger, more rigidly enclosed form of life. The life that emerges 
from the game for Keith constitutes his self-identity: he becomes utterly definable by the 
game, negating any aspects of his life that might exceed the limits of the game: “He 
wanted to rake in chips and stack them. The game mattered, the stacking of chips, the eye 
count, the play and dance of hand and eye. He was identical with these things” (228). As 
with the earlier discussion of the identities that emerge from a community’s auto-
immunization, Keith gives himself over to a life into which the violence of the game 
shapes him. The game becomes a world to him, containing its reality comprehensively. 
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Keith finds in the life of the game an inoculation against the mortal danger of 
contingency and event, but this comes at the cost of his own vital potential to become. 
If we accept Sloterdijk’s argument that terrorism in the modern era involves the 
explication of latent environmental conditions from the aspect of their vulnerability, then 
we can say that the aesthetic function of DeLillo’s novel is to perform a terroristic 
explication of the conditions for community and identity. With the interpellation of the 
audience by the Falling Man performance artist, we observe a confounding of the 
spectators’ habitual modes of recognition and identification. It becomes unclear where 
the line between terrorist and victim essentially resides, and such a condition refutes the 
spectators’ ability to justify in the usual ways the immunization of the community against 
terroristic threats. This runs parallel to the above discussion of the terroristic violence 
inherent to the constitution of political communities – the necessary antagonism at play in 
the establishment of communal values, freedoms, and identities. The apocalyptic moment 
of 9/11, while violently rupturing the logics of democratic-liberal politics within 
American hegemony, brought to the fore, at least for a moment, the constructed quality of 
the American political community. The nation was forced to decide how they would 
choose to understand themselves in their response to the attacks, and, for the most part, 
they chose the path of immunity, underscoring the boundaries of an American identity. 
Similarly, the aesthetic terrorism of Falling Man, as it confounds identity, also 
draws to our perceptual spotlight the largely obscured mechanisms by which we construct 
and understand ourselves, who we are. These mechanisms – which include the sharing of 
close space, the writing of narratives, and the emergence of formal rituals and 
prohibitions – are centered around the production of community, as well as the manner in 
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which we ourselves are caught up in and transformed by community. By explicating 
these mechanisms to us, as spectators of the novel, DeLillo puts us in a position where 
we, too, must decide on our response, knowing that many of the means available to us for 
constructing common identity run parallel to those that result in terror. These particular 
elements are explicated here as strategies of power at play in the social ecology within 
which we interact and present ourselves. Such an explication relies on a theory of power, 
following Foucault, that does not assume a state sovereignty or a specific institution to 
administer its force but rather views power as “the moving substrate of force relations 
which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are 
always local and unstable” (History of Sexuality 93). In this view, power is everywhere, 
as in an atmosphere full of functional elements that dynamically precipitate into 
contingent forms. Mechanisms like ritual, identity, the sharing of space, and the closure 
of community constitute strategies of power responsive to already precipitated or 
precipitating states of power. Terror, though a product of these strategies, also makes 
these strategies visible. 
 
“Living tissue, who you are”: Terror and Control 
 
The core themes animating this essay emerged through the encounter with a work 
of art in Falling Man. The presentation of the work of art functions as an act of terror. 
The act of terror functions as an apocalypse in both senses of the word, as world-
shattering catastrophe and as revelation or uncovering. The apocalypse confounds our 
habitual practices of constructing social worlds and communities. Furthermore, the 
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apocalypse also reveals the contingency of enacting these logics, which so often tend 
toward the terrorism of autoimmunization and which nevertheless reside all around us in 
the atmosphere, “already in the air, in the bodies of the young, and what is next to come” 
(Falling Man 70). As the aesthetic terrorism of the novel turns our eyes back to life in its 
intricate vitality, we face a menacing vision: we are left with the horror of the confusion 
and loss of identity and the paranoia of the policing of identities. What we have, then, is 
an apocalyptic aesthetic that ends the world as we know it simply by explicitly 
articulating to us the mechanisms that make our world. The air becomes dystopian. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be an urging in the novel toward some way of coping with 
these dangers, and what we find in the figures of Keith and Lianne are two different 
gestures toward exodus from the poisonous conditions of the post-9/11 atmosphere. 
These gestures, as I will argue, necessarily fail because the novel lacks a sufficient 
acknowledgment of the nature of control in the present era. 
Before articulating these two responses, however, we must be clear on the 
historically emergent patterns of power that also constitute the background to the work, 
patterns that Gilles Deleuze descriptively captures under the moniker “control society.” 
While the novel clearly registers the emergence of these patterns through its atmospheric 
figurations of terror, it fails to adequately acknowledge the dynamic economic substrate 
involved in contemporary governance of life that channels life into certain formations 
that cannot be sufficiently captured in an analysis of atomized bodies. Deleuze further 
develops Foucault’s analysis of the prominent new form of power that emerged in the late 
eighteenth century and continues to evolve – the shift from a primarily disciplinary power 
that focused specifically on the particular movements of individual bodies to what 
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Foucault terms “biopolitics.” This biopolitics, as Foucault remarks in his lecture series 
titled Society Must Be Defended, applies “not to man-as-body but to the living man, to 
man-as-living-being” (242) and works by “massifying” groups into controllable 
populations rather than into the sort of embodied individuals that would be susceptible to 
disciplinary control (243). With this shift, the atmospheric framework for understanding 
terrorism becomes even more relevant, as biopolitics’ primary modes of analyzing the 
movements of populations are, we could say, climatological in nature, though seeking to 
analyze specifically human populations in their relationship to the larger milieus in which 
they reside: “The phenomena addressed by biopolitics are, essentially, aleatory events 
that occur within a population that exists over a period of time. […] The mechanisms 
introduced by biopolitics include forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures” 
(246). From these analytical schemes, biopolitics attempts to control the development of 
life within certain populations not by focusing on the direct manipulation of individual 
bodies but by regularizing the overall flux. 
The goal of this power is to produce social norms that serve the interests of the 
biopolitical governing entities – interests that, as biopolitics links in with the 
development of neoliberal privatization and naturalization of market dynamics during the 
twentieth century, become primarily economic in nature. Foucault notes in his lectures on 
The Birth of Biopolitics that the role of neoliberalism takes on a uniquely radical form in 
America from the mid-twentieth century onward: “American neo-liberalism still 
involves, in fact, the generalization of the economic form of the market. It involves 
generalizing it throughout the social body and including the whole of the social system 
not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges” (243). This 
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“absolute generalization” of the form and logics of the market demanded “a sort of 
economic analysis of the non-economic” (243). Therefore, power grapples with the 
movements of social populations in economic terms and seeks to enforce a regularity 
between those movements and the flow of financial capital, toward the growth and 
fortification of the market. Deleuze argues that as the proliferation of biopower 
transforms the larger part of society from disciplinary society to “societies of control,” 
biopolitics places previously governable “interiors” – which are enclosed institutions 
such as the family, the school, and the prison – into crisis, favoring rather the more 
adaptive control afforded through modulation (“Postscript” 4). Like Foucault’s 
regularization, modulation affects the general movement of mass populations, exerting 
mechanisms of security and freedom onto the flux in order to enforce a general 
movement toward market productivity and national interest within the global market. 
If power has moved toward modulation of adaptive and unenclosed realms of 
social experience, then a disproportionate analytical orientation toward singular bodies 
and enclosed institutions fails to respond to the real power at work in a social milieu. And 
yet, both Keith and Lianne Neudecker seem to be entrapped in such orientations by the 
end of Falling Man, even as they attempt to free themselves from the negative terroristic 
conditions stirring in the post-9/11 air. Linda S. Kauffman, in her reading of the novel, 
argues that the central atomistic theme of the text is that “what unites us is that we are all 
bodies in rest or motion, in space, on a small planet” (141). While admitting that the 
novel lacks a moral imperative, Kauffman argues that it nonetheless encourages us to 
consider empathically the unity of our experiences as bodies in the environment. 
However, we should consider, with an awareness to the workings of control society’s 
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massifying tactics, that an empathic attention to bodies as atomized singularities may be 
missing a crucial point about the workings of power today. 
Keith’s and Lianne’s gestures toward exodus from controlling modulations of life 
are, in fact, centrally bound up in the individual body, either as its negation or its 
affirmation. They attempt to enclose themselves in a restricted iteration of life, to 
immunize themselves against the apparently dangerous processes of living, produced by 
the atmosphere of terror, that would cut through them. For instance, we have already seen 
Keith’s retreat to the enclosed world of the poker game. Keith’s gesture is marked by a 
disavowal of the body, as he submits the movements of his body to the totalitarian control 
of the rules of the game and the play of chance. His is a rigid form of life that commands 
the body comprehensively, through its rituals, and so makes itself appear as a territory 
securely protected from the control society that monitors and modulates the processes of 
life as such. Even if this retreat to totalitarian ritual-formalism succeeds in bracketing 
Keith off from the global community, it presents to us the (dis)embodiment of the terror 
of immunity, preserving Keith’s life by giving it a specific form while simultaneously 
ending his life by cutting it off from the ontological openness to becoming through 
relationship with others that allows it to be life in the first place. However, the 
modulation of life in control society would seem to problematize our lauding of such 
openness to living, if it is such openness to living that gives entrance to the influence of a 
biopolitics interested more in the preservation of the market than the flourishing of 
human beings. We will need to ask ourselves whether the terrorism of immunity is the 
only way out from control, as well as whether that exit can even be possible, given 
control society’s capacity to instrumentalize communities toward the governance of 
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populations. Community may also be the entryway for governmentality to identify 
populations and therefore influence their movement or suppress them when they venture 
too radically apart from the norm. 
If Keith responds to terror and control through a disavowal of the body, we could 
say alternatively that Lianne responds through an affirmation of the body as a defense 
against terror, but in such a way that is still too atomized to account for the work of 
control. In the final scene focused on Lianne, we find her contemplating her body after 
thinking through her relationship to God and religion, having recently half-returned to the 
Catholic church as a means of finding some resolution or comfort following the 
catastrophe: 
There were nine people at mass today. She watched them stand, sit and 
kneel and she did what they did but failed to respond as they did when the 
priest recited lines from the liturgy. 
 She thought that the hovering possible presence of God was the 
thing that created loneliness and doubt in the soul and she also thought 
that God was the thing, the entity existing outside space and time that 
resolved this doubt in the tonal power of a word, a voice. 
 God is the voice that says, “I am not here.” (236) 
Lianne makes two direct moves against the sort of immunization that we have already 
identified as functioning in the nature of terrorism. For one, she opts out of the ritual 
vocalization of the liturgy. While she performs the embodied motions of the ceremony 
(not, perhaps, unlike Keith at the poker table), she does not participate in those statements 
that offer the core ideological binding principles of the religious community. Such rituals 
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serve to close the community against others who would not agree with the propositions 
included in the liturgy. Second, Lianne thinks of God in terms that explicitly mark the 
concept of “God” as a property around which an immunized community would coalesce. 
God as a property of an enclosed community would, in fact, create loneliness in the sole 
for those who fail to wholly belong to the community. The loneliness is a product of the 
lack of the common property that binds the belonging-togetherness of the community, 
which in this case has been defined as God. Therefore, to think of God as the voice that 
says, “I am not here,” is to think of God as the lack that cuts across communities, refusing 
immunization; “God” is the name Lianne applies to the munus that, when genuinely 
shared, upholds the community’s openness against the terrorism of immunization. In this 
way, Lianne stands in as the “non-devoted intelligentsia” that Sloterdijk argues is 
necessary within “the twilight of immunity” (110-1). In such a condition, those who 
understand the play of power and violence in the contemporary world are disillusioned to 
such a degree that they give up on the claims to a universalist ethics and peaceful 
coexistence. Yet, they cannot enact their antagonistic immunities innocently. 
 Lianne still seeks some sense of safe enclosure, but she shows an awareness of the 
dangers of closing around communal boundaries. Therefore, she pursues a sense of 
enclosure oriented around her own body, instead: 
It was just her, the body through and though. It was the body and 
everything it carried, inside and out, identity and memory and human heat. 
It wasn’t even something she smelled so much as knew. It was something 
she’d always known. The child was in it, the girl who wanted to be other 
people, and obscure things she could not name. It was a small moment, 
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already passing, the kind of moment that is always only seconds from 
forgetting. 
 She was ready to be alone, in reliable calm, she and the kid, the 
way they were before the planes appeared that day, silver crossing blue. 
(236) 
The way Lianne thinks of this reconciliation with her own body sounds fatalistic, in a 
way, as though this were the best possible resignation in a world that does not allow for 
emancipatory sentiments. At first, she thinks of her body as a visceral complex, involving 
the physical excretions of heat and sweat. But then she turns to viewing the body as a 
container for memory and identity, the sorts of things that are already bound up in 
community and, in their own contingency and constructedness, allow for the community 
to exert influence over the person’s form of life. She imagines the potentialities that have 
been eliminated in her own contingency, the “other people” she wanted to be and might 
have been but is not. In this sense, she perceives her body as a container of being, trapped 
in its own facticity, and this is for the fact of its being enclosed, solid, identifiable as her. 
Again, she treats the body here as an atomic entity, separable from the rest of the world 
and from others. While she avoids the terrorism inherent to community-formation, her 
recourse to the enclosure of the body does not avoid the danger of immunization but just, 
at best, minimizes its effects on those around her. “She wanted to be safe in the world” 
(216), to preserve herself in some available fashion. Perhaps the problem comes down to 
her viewing herself as comprehensively contained in her singular, atomic body, that her 
embodied nature might offer a safety against the terrorism that would take her up, too, in 
its activity. 
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It is worth noting here that, while revealing the other terroristic elements at work 
atmospherically, the terrorism in the novel is still represented as singularly embodied. 
Take the Falling Man as a precise case-in-point. The Falling Man mimics the bodily form 
of a specific victim of the bombing of the World Trade Center towers. In his act, a single 
body is held in suspense before the spectator’s eyes, frozen in free-fall but never allowed 
to drop all the way, as happened for the original victim on the day of the attacks. Janiak’s 
repetition of the event of terror takes the form of a suspension of bodies, as though the 
fear we would associate with the performance (apart from the horror of a confounded 
identity) is the loss of the body – the body’s death. If the performance were to go all the 
way to impact – (forgive the grotesque suggestion) – perhaps it would capture a more 
visceral horror associated with the terrorism of 9/11. Martin Amis refers to a particularly 
upsetting detail that returns to his imagination as he remembers that day, that of “the 
‘pink mist’ in the air, caused by the explosion of the falling bodies” (“The Voice of the 
Lonely Crowd”). This phenomenon was discussed in the news reports of the weeks 
following the events: “[S]ome of those nearest the flames chose to jump rather than 
suffocate or burn to death. They landed with such force, according to an eyewitness who 
was watching along with New York’s mayor, Rudy Giuliani, that a pink mist of gore rose 
from the sidewalk as they hit” (Adler). This is, of course, an element of suicide terrorism 
that cannot be performed by a street artist – a fact that likely contributes to the singularly 
abject horror it provokes – but it also emphatically underscores the atmospheric nature of 
terror in control society, which involves not merely the sovereign administration of death 
but also the proliferation of death and disembodiment through the atmosphere. 
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 It is perhaps best to say that Falling Man simply does not provide answers to the 
contemporary situation of atmospheric terrorism and control that provokes our fears and 
paranoia, but rather that the novel more clearly outlines the sorts of questions regarding 
power that we ought to be asking today. If many of the political options available to us 
tend so susceptibly toward the violence that is functionally inherent to terrorism, how do 
we keep our hands clean and allow for life, rather than death, to proliferate across the 
globe? While the novel does not provide a direct answer to this question, I would like to 
conclude by suggesting that we might get a glimpse of a solution through a particular 
interpretation of Lianne’s experience viewing the still life paintings by Morandi: “The 
objects in the painting faded into the figures behind them, the woman smoking in the 
chair, the standing man. […] She was passing beyond pleasure into some kind of 
assimilation. She was trying to absorb what she saw, take it home, wrap it around her, 
sleep in it. There was so much to see. Turn it into living tissue, who you are” (210). In 
this scene, for a moment, despite what other gestures toward enclosure Lianne might be 
making elsewhere, we observe her attempting to absorb the multiplicity of that which is 
around her. This act is an act of appropriation, where that which fluctuates in the 
atmosphere, that which exists as other to her and outside herself, she attempts to bring 
within, to turn “into living tissue,” who she is. The move Lianne considers in this scene, 
in viewing a depiction of a still life that refers her apocalyptically back to the life that 
conditions everything around her, works against immunity in all senses. Here Lianne 
enacts something that Esposito, developing an idea present in Deleuze, calls “‘a norm of 
life’ that doesn’t subject life to the transcendence of a norm, but makes the norm the 
immanent impulse of life. […] [It is] giving to the norm the potentiality of life’s 
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becoming” (Bíos 194). This association with the life that circulates all around us is not 
animated by the impulse of preservation but that of assimilation: opening oneself to 
alterity and the othering of oneself. The danger in this technique is that it provides no 
safety, no protection from the world – it is absolute vulnerability. Particularly in control 
society, there is no promise that openness and the allowing of life itself to constitute our 
norms – thinking the norm in the unity of life – will save us from the machinations of 
neoliberal profiteering and the insidious seductions of consumer-capitalism. However, 
the problem regarding the terrorism inherent to the political – and not as exceptional to it 
– that Falling Man reveals through its own act of terror upon spectators can contribute 
virtuously to our approach to the world. When we consider the historical costs of 
pursuing counter-terroristic violence as a response to the spectacular violence that 
emerged into visibility during the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we might at this juncture do well 
to consider the warning that U.S. Representative for California Barbara Lee voiced on 
September 14th, 2001, as she cast the lone vote against the authorization of retaliatory 
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